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Emerging Public International Banking Law? Lessons
from the Law of the Sea Experience
Barbara C. Matthews*
"The time has come," the Walrus said,
"To talk of many things:
Of shoes-and ships-and sealing-wax-
Of cabbages and kings."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The aftershocks of last year's financial sector implosion continue to
reverberate. Policymakers, lawmakers, and regulators coming together under the
umbrella of the Group of Twenty (G20)2 seek to create new standards and
structures to address weaknesses at the global and national levels so as to
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between the law of the sea and emerging public international banking law. She appreciates the
thoughtful and helpful comments of Professor Lawrence Baxter and Edwin Truman on an earlier
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while this Article was written.
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There 56 (California 1983). The poem
tells the tale of a Walrus and a Carpenter that lure young oysters away from home o they can be
eaten up in a picnic by the sea.
2 The Group of Twenty consists of: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany,
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey,
the US, the UK, and the EU. In addition, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the
Chair of the International Monetary & Finance Committee, and the Chair of the Development
Committee hold seats at the table. Observers include informal international regulatory standard
setters such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
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prevent further economic dislocations in financial markets around the world.
They draw on history's lessons from past financial crises to help guide their
policy responses.
This Article suggests that another discipline-the law of the sea and its
subsequent codification into treaty-based law during the twentieth century-
holds important lessons for the development of global financial intermediation
activity and its regulation at the international level. The three main lessons are:
1. The path towards codified global consensus is neither linear nor
inevitable. In fact, the controversies generated by the law of the sea
codification process during the twentieth century suggest that more
reliable and pragmatic arrangements based on customary international
law are needed in the financial context.
2. Some level of codification and sovereignty sharing are inevitable and
necessary when cross-border economic and political activity reaches a
critical mass.
3. In particular, credible and durable global standards require real,
predictable, and accepted enforcement mechanisms in order for
institutional stability that can support growth enhancing cross-border
economic activity to evolve.
Absorbing these lessons will help policymakers build a more resilient global
structure that can deliver confidence and economic growth-two components
that remain missing from today's environment.
The body of law known as the law of the sea spans the centuries and, like
its namesake, is vast. This Article does not attempt to describe all aspects of that
body of law, nor does it attempt to address all modern political controversies
associated with it. Instead, this Article focuses on the evolution from economic
need to customary international law to codification in order to draw lessons for
today's normative efforts regarding finance and economics at the global level.
One key controversy merits immediate attention, however.
During the twentieth century, the law of the sea had been criticized as
having a democratic deficit because the customary standards articulated in treaty-
based codifications deprived modern and newer nation-states from participating
G20 Final Communiqu6 ("London Communique"), The Global Plan For Recovery and Reform, 1 4
(London Apr 2, 2009), online at www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf (visited Nov
21, 2009) ("We have today therefore pledged to do whatever is necessary to: restore confidence,
growth, and jobs; repair the financial system to restore lending; strengthen financial regulation to
rebuild trust; fund and reform our international financial institutions to overcome this crisis and
prevent future ones; promote global trade and investment and reject protectionism, to underpin
prosperity; and build an inclusive, green, and sustainable recovery. By acting together to fulfill
these pledges we will bring the world economy out of recession and prevent a crisis like this from
recurring in the future.").
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in the standard-setting process.4 Some might suggest that therefore the law of
the sea does not provide the best example for modern global normative
processes. This Article does not opine on the merits of the democratic deficit
debate regarding the law of the sea. This Article instead asserts that the modern
global normative process in the financial sector area composed of the G20 and
its observers (the international regulatory standard-setters) make irrelevant the
democratic deficit argument raised by law of the sea critics because all relevant
standard-setters are global in their constituency.' The Article focuses on the
process of developing global international law frameworks and, for this purpose,
the law of the sea discipline is both helpful and instructive.
II. SHOES AND SHIPS
The discipline we know today as "public international law" in the non-war
context is rooted in economic activity arising from ocean exploration for
commercial and state purposes and the need for certainty in the delineation of
rights and responsibilities among increasingly strong and centralized "modern"
nation-states.6 Hugo Grotius, his intellectual colleagues, and his successors
created a conceptual framework allocating rights and responsibilities of
sovereigns with overlapping interests and jurisdictions in an atmosphere of
heady globalization, intense technological innovation, and intense competition
among emerging nation-states whose wealth and power were growing as their
global trading activities increased.' The tools for this first era of globalization
4 See Bernard H. Oxman, David D. Caron, and Charles 0. Berderi, eds, The Law of the Sea. U.S.
Polio Dilemma, 127-144 (ICS 1983).
5 That is, the G20 is a representative body of the world's largest economies to which effectively all
other global groups now report, regardless of their compositional arrangements. This Article
leaves for another day the issues of whether the various international regulatory standard setters
are sufficiently accountable democratically to merit their normative role and whether they have
sufficient credibility to continue generating global standards. The latter is particularly true in the
regulatory space, where not all global regulatory groups (particularly the Basel Committee) are
global in its membership. It may also be true of global groups composed of private sector entities
(for example, the International Accounting Standards Board).
6 "[O]ther causes were at work which were to make it impossible for the world to accept the
absence of bonds between state and state, and to bring them into more intimate and constant
relations with one another than in the days when their theoretical unity was accepted everywhere.
Among these causes may be mentioned (1) the impetus to commerce and adventure caused by the
discovery of America and the new route to the Indies... [the new discipline of international law]
proclaimed that [nation-states] were bound to one another by the supremacy of law." J.L. Brierly,
The Law of Naions: An Introduction to the Internaional Law of Peace 6-7 (Oxford 6th ed 1963).
7 This Article does not attempt to address the arguments raised over the centuries about whether
this growing economic power was morally appropriate and what the remedies should be today for
abuses during the colonization period. For present purposes, it suffices simply to state the fact
that this era of globalization generated unparalleled economic growth in an environment of
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were the sea-lanes and the ships that carried people and goods between
countries for commercial purposes.8
Greater familiarity with deep-sea currents and advances in ship
construction and navigation generated increased private (albeit state-sponsored)
commercial activity subject to tax and royalty arrangements from the relevant
crown. These private actors and their state sponsors shouldered risks still known
to sailors today: storms, navigational uncertainties, delays, and pirates.9 Clarity
regarding rights and responsibilities among states sponsoring economic activity
was needed in order to encourage people to risk their lives on the high seas for
material gain. Moreover, that clarity required strong international cooperation
and consensus in order to ensure that the standards would be honored by
independent economic and military agents of many different countries crossing
the oceans in increasing numbers.
substantial technological innovation and gave rise to the need for a legal framework to govern
interactions among state and non-state actors in a new sphere. Modern commitments to
democratic decision-making govern today's normative activities at the global level. For more
details on the role that global ocean exploration played in generating economic growth and
technological innovation during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, consider Dava Sobel,
Longitude (Walker 1995); Fernand Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce (Harper & Row 1982); Benn
Steil and Manuel Hinds, Money, Markets " Sovereigny (Yale 2009).
8 Consider Sobel, Longitude (cited in note 7); Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce (cited in note 7); Steil
and Hinds, Mony, Markets & Sovereign y (cited in note 7). Recently, some have asserted that
fifteenth century China also launched global exploration and potentially commercial activities, a
full seventy years prior to the European expeditions. Consider, Gavin Menzies, 1421: The Year
China Discovered the World (Random House 2002). However, even if the claims of Chinese
circumnavigation are correct, the fact is that the Chinese leadership in the fifteenth century turned
sharply inwards and avoided international engagements, thus precluding participating in
international normative processes for a few hundred years. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great
Powers: Economic Change and Militay ConJlict from 1500 to 2000 7-9 (Knopf Doubleday 1989) (noting
in particular that the Chinese expedition of 1433 was the last of the line, and three years later an
imperial edict banned the construction of seagoing ships). Substantial evidence also exists that the
Arab nations conducted serious and ongoing commercial relationships using the sea-lanes in the
Indian Ocean and, during the Middle Ages, the Mediterranean. Braudel, Wheels of Commerce at 120-
125 (cited in note 7) (describing the merchants of the Indian Ocean and the East Indies). See also
Jacques Gemet, A Histoy of Chinese CiviiZalion 326 (Cambridge 1982) ("Progress in navigational
techniques made the expansion of maritime activity possible, but the underlying reasons for this
expansion were connected with political circumstances and the development of the mercantile
economy."). However, any customary standards developed among Arab, Chinese, and Indian
subcontinent seafarers did not evolve into the global standards we know today as the law of the
sea. Similarly, the vast trading empires conducted by the Incan and Aztec empires did not
generate global standards. The equal participation of all nations in global normative processes is a
welcome twentieth century contribution to standard-setting, despite its obvious weaknesses and
challenges.
9 See generally Sobel, Longitude (cited in note 7).
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Even as scientists, astronomers, and mathematicians sought to identify
reliable tools for increasing the precision and clarity in navigation,' ° legal
scholars simultaneously sought to articulate common standards for allocating
rights and responsibilities of nations sponsoring those sailing ships in global
commerce. Their thinking has defined navigational and other international legal
disciplines to this day, extending up to outer space and down to the depths of
the sea floor."
The jurisprudential thinking developed by these scholars balanced each
nation's need to access the oceans with the security and economic needs of
individuals and states to allocate rights and responsibilities fairly.' 2 The key
components include:
" The concept of a global commons, or "high seas," which cannot
be "owned" by any sovereign and through which rights of free
transit would be undisputed;
1 3
" The concept of "universal jurisdiction" in which certain criminal
acts conducted on the high seas can be adjudicated by any state or
aggrieved actor;14
10 Id.
i Lauren Morello, US Pushes for Law of the Sea Ralification as New Arctic Mapping Project Begins, NY
Times (July 29, 2009), online at http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/07/29/29climatewire-us-
pushes-for-law-of-the-sea-ratification-as-89174.html (visited Nov 21, 2009). The US is the only
major industrialized nation that has not ratified the Law of the Sea. The Law of the Sea governs
navigation tights and addresses species protection and other environmental issues.
12 This thinking itself evolved from a much older body of law: the Lex Mercatoria. See Steil and
Hinds, Money, Markets & Sovereignty at 33 (cited in note 7) ("Yet the history of law in the Western
world, going back to ancient Greece, shows clearly it is not possible to separate the activity of
private exchange from the evolution of law and the evolution of thought about law . . . it is
specifically in dealings with foreigners that it was necessary for law to develop which was
independent of any ruler's will. Good law was always old law, and old law is what emerged by dint
of its consistency with what people came to expect as just behavior from others."). What was
revolutionary about the thinking associated with the law of the sea was that it extrapolated well-
known jurisdictional and state-limiting context to the oceans and then declared large portions of
physical territory (the high seas) exempt from sovereign territorial ownership and jurisdiction.
13 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS III'), Part VII, Arts 87.1 and 89 (Article 87.1
states that the high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or landlocked, and lists the
freedoms available on the high seas. Article 89 says that no State may validly purport to subject
any part of the high seas to its sovereignty). See also Btierly, Law of Nations at 304-316 (cited in
note 6) (discussing jurisdiction on the high seas); Oxman et al, Law of the Sea, 19-22 (cited in note
4) (discussing national jurisdiction).
14 Brierly, Law of Nations at 311 (cited in note 6) ("The Convention contains comprehensive
provisions concerning 'piracy' and 'hot pursuit' which constitute the first attempts to formulate
authoritative statements of law on these matters."). Those acts considered to be direct violations
of the law of nations by individuals and for which universal jurisdiction exists are: piracy, slavery,
and hot pursuit. With respect to hot pursuit, arrest on the high seas is permitted "when a coastal
state has good reason to believe that the ship has broken its laws . . . [with respect to] customs,
Winter 2010
Mlatthews
Chicago Journal of International Law
" The concept that the Home State (the ship's flag country) governs
the ship and its interactions with foreigners on board those
vessels;"5
" The concept that even when foreign flag vessels have the right of
free transit within such "contiguous zones," the port (Host) state
can impose conditions, standards, and taxes on foreign flag vessels
seeking to use port services and trade with local business;
16
* The concept that sovereign states have legitimate economic
interests in contiguous areas.
17
These concepts evolved and were enforced as "customary international
law" for centuries.
The concept most intriguing in the financial context is that a body of law
has existed for hundreds of years that permits Home states to project their
sovereignty beyond their territory for certain limited purposes. Those purposes
are: ensuring that the ships chartered under the Home country flag are
seaworthy when they depart the Home port and are engaged in legal
commerce;" ensuring that the Home state's laws and rules govern all who board
the ship on the high seas;' 9 ensuring some minimum harmonization of standards
that all ships are entitled to enforce on the high seas against other actors with
respect to activities that can damage all participants (for example, piracy); and
submitting to foreign jurisdiction when the ship reaches a foreign port and
fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regulation for the protection of which the contiguous zone was
established." Id at 314.
15 Id at 310-311 ("The Convention recognizes the right of every state to sail ships under its own flag
and to determine the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of
ships in its territory and for the right to fly its flag... a 'genuine link' must exist between the state
and the ship and that in particular the state must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control
over ships of its flag in administrative, technical, and social matters ... ships on the high seas are
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of one state only and that the state whose flag they are entitled
to fly.").
16 For an abridged evolutionary history of these concepts from the sixteenth to the mid-twentieth
century, see Brierly, Law of Nations at 194-221 (cited in note 6) (discussing maritime territory, the
continental shelf, and territorial air space).
17 Id at 216 ("The Convention recognizes that over the continental shelf, as so defined, the coastal
state possesses ipsojure, without any act of occupation or proclamation, 'sovereign rghts for thepupose
of exploring it and exploiing its natural resources.' It deliberately refrains from granting full territorial
sovereignty over the continental shelf because of a fear that this might be but a short step to
sovereignty over both the waters and air space above it; and to hammer the point home it
expressly declares that the coastal state's rights over the continental shelf do not affect the legal
status of the superjacent waters as high seas or that of the airspace above the high seas.").
18 UNCLOS III, Part VII, Art 94.3 (Article 94 states that every state shall take such measures for
ships flying its flag as are necessary to ensure safety).
19 UNCLOS III, Part VII, Arts 92, 94 (Article 92 states that ships shall sail under the flag of one
State only and shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas).
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foreign territorial waters. In addition, the law of the sea makes clear that
warships of one country may not board foreign flag vessels on the high seas
except to address piracy, slavery, unauthorized broadcasting, a ship without a
nationality, and operations without a flag.2°
This balance of rights and responsibilities among Home/flag states and
Host/coastal port states is familiar to banking law experts, even if no formal
treaties have yet evolved to articulate that balance in the international banking
supervision context. The legal concepts in both disciplines with regard to the
rights and responsibilities of Home and Host states are broadly the same at the
two territorial points. In the banking arena, Home country regulators are
responsible for consolidated supervision of the holding company, both with
respect to setting normative standards and enforcement of those standards.
They are responsible for ensuring that the banking organization is "seaworthy"
when it expands abroad. Host country regulators have the authority to grant or
deny access to their banking markets to foreign banks, based on an assessment
of whether the foreign bank applicant might pose a threat to the stability and
credibility of the local banking market. Host country regulators are authorized to
enforce those standards on local operations of foreign banks.
These norms evolved into clearly defined "Minimum Standards" the
substance of which was progressively articulated by banking supervisors from
the Group of Ten 2' countries from the early 1970s to the early 1990s.22 The
initial effort to obtain international consensus on these Home and Host
responsibilities arose in response to a global banking crisis. In 1974, a German
bank (Herstatt) was closed by local regulators before it had paid out a substantial
number of contracts in the foreign exchange market in New York. The bank's
failure to make payments wreaked havoc on the foreign exchange market
20 UNCLOS III, Part VII, Art 110.
21 The Group of Ten consists of: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. These are also the original members of both the Board
of Governors of the Bank for International Settlements and the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (although the leadership of both these entities has recently expanded to include
additional countries). They have not issued a communiqu6 since October 23, 2007. All past
communiques can be found online at www.bis.org (visited Nov 21, 2009). It seems highly likely
that their relevance may be waning as the Group of Twenty with its more global membership
gains momentum and credibility.
22 For example, the US implemented the substance of the Basel Minimum Standards in 1991 as the
Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act, largely in reaction to the supervisory gaps
discovered following the failure of a major, criminal, cross-border bank: the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International ("BCCI"). However, the implementation was undertaken without
reference to the Basel standards or to other global supervisory developments. Foreign Bank
Supervision Enhancement Act, Implicaions for Foreign and Domeslic Banks, 58 BNA Banking Report 1001
(1992).
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globally. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was created under the
auspices of the Bank for International Settlements to increase cross-border
supervisory cooperation and to delineate clear allocations of rights and
responsibilities between Home and Host states. 23 As with the law of the sea, the
underlying expectation was that global financial market integration was both
desirable and would continue to grow. The policy goal was to find ways to
generate greater clarity regarding overlapping sovereign jurisdiction, which in
turn would facilitate the prudent flow of economic activity across borders.
A modern expansion of this thinking can be found in proposals for
complex, cross-border banks to create "living wills" or separately capitalized
subsidiaries to facilitate their closure in the event that the bank encounters
financial difficulty. 24 This stream of work also suggests the limits of engagement
and political will. The proposed approaches would attempt to avoid the need for
government intervention and cross-border "burden-sharing" associated with the
wind-up of a global financial institution with obligations in multiple jurisdictions.
The stated goal is to require financial firms to have plans in place for liquidation
of positions and possibly the creation of separately capitalized subsidiaries so
that winding-up activities can be undertaken without government intervention.
If this work stream goes forward, it potentially represents an effort to avoid the
difficult issues associated with overlapping jurisdictions by placing the first
responsibility on the financial firms themselves. It remains to be seen whether
such plans can be legally enforced in a wide range of jurisdictions with different
legal traditions. It also remains to be seen whether they can be implemented in
an economically sensible manner that does not undermine global commerce.
23 Consider Michael P. Malloy, International Banking: Cases, Materials, and Problems (Carolina
Academic 1998). See also Joseph J. Norton, Comment on the Developing Transnational
Network(s) in the Area of International Financial Regulation: The Underpinnings of a New
Bretton Woods II Global Financial System Framework, 43 Intl Lawyer 175, 182 (2009) ("From
this beginning, we have, in the mid-1970s, the random and reactive formation of the informal
Basel Committee by the G-10, which introduced the bank regulators and supervisors of major
Western nations into the equation.").
24, "Work is ongoing to implement the FSF Principles for Cross-border Cooperation and Crisis
Management. Schedules for firm-specific cross-border contingency planning discussions have
been set out and will take place in 2009 and first half of 2010. The FSB Cross-Border Crisis
Management Working Group is preparing a list of the main elements to be included in
contingency planning discussions, including a template for 'de-risking' plans to be prepared by the
firms. De-risking plans will cover the options the firms would need to consider to exit risky
positions and scale back their activities, in an orderly fashion and without government
intervention." Progress Report on the Actions to Promote Financial Regulatoy Reform Issued by the US Chair
of the Pittsburgh G20 Summit ("Pittsburgh Progress Report") 3 (Sep 25, 2009), online at
www.pittsburghsummit.gov/documents/organization/129866.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
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Viewed in a more positive light, the work stream could also be construed
as an effort by policymakers to continue supporting cross-border financial
market activity without getting bogged down in tedious and likely controversial
negotiations on how losses could be shared across finance ministries in crisis
countries-a negotiation that could likely take years. These proposals could also
be seen conceptually as an extension of the Host/Home state authorities'
legitimate efforts to ensure the reliability and safety of their docking stations and
harbors by imposing clear standards on the ships that enter their jurisdiction,
including restrictions on the means by which waste disposal occurs while in the
Host port.
Growing cross-border financial market activity also increases the
opportunities for criminals to evade a broad number of Home and Host laws.
The banking analog for high seas piracy can be found in the anti-money
laundering paradigm, which assumes that an otherwise innocent financial
institution is being used to commit crimes against its will and internal policies.
Thus, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was created to facilitate standard
setting with respect to anti-money laundering standards and to facilitate cross-
border cooperation when law enforcement officers are in "hot pursuit" of
suspected criminal elements. As with the "hot pursuit" standard in the law of the
sea, a state may pursue suspected wrongdoing in its territory (and other
territories) subject to certain procedural safeguards.
A number of important differences exist between the law of the sea and
banking law today. The most important differences relate to the doctrine of the
high seas and universal jurisdiction. There is no part of the financial landscape
today that is viewed by the law as a "global commons" to which all nations and
private parties should have a right of equal and unfettered access. However, the
G20 process and the global but informal institutional arrangements it is creating
suggest that a comparable concept may be emerging globally. All countries share
a common interest and collectively may exercise authority over the conduct of
national economic, financial, and monetary policy due to the disastrous spillover
effects associated with negligence and mismanagement at the national regulatory
level.
A global commons may not exist in the private financial space, but a global
common interest may exist in policing that space. The G20 heads of state and
government have held three summit meetings (November 2008; April 2009;
September 2009) to address a broad range of financial and economic policy
issues arising from the credit meltdown. They have made it clear through their
commitment to free trade and various central bank support mechanisms for
different portions of the credit and transactions market that they seek to keep
the modern lines of commerce and finance (including use of derivative financial
instruments and alternative investment vehicles) open and functioning. "We
believe that the only sure foundation for sustainable globalization and rising
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prosperity for all is an open world economy based on market principles,
effective regulation, and strong global institutions."' At the same time, however,
they want to ensure that those financial institution vessels are governed by
appropriately vigorous minimum standards regarding their operations.
2 6
The G20 wants to keep the modern lanes of global finance open to all
appropriately regulated credit vessels that seek to sail the open seas in search of
growth-enhancing opportunities,27 and it wants to tighten the enforcement
regime against tax evaders, 28 adding to the universe of bad actors subject to
international coordination on "hot pursuit" matters. Its goal then is directly
25 London Communiqu6 at 3 (cited in note 3). That support was recently underscored by the
European Central Bank's decision in May 2009 to purchase covered bonds issued in Europe.
Those bonds, like securitization instruments, structure payouts to investors based on an
underlying pool of assets (usually mortgages or public sector debt). However, unlike securitization
instruments, they are guaranteed by the issuer's balance sheet. The Financial Times reports that
issuance activity regarding sovereign bonds "roared" following the ECB's endorsement of this
type of derivative instrument. David Oakley, Eumpe's Revival in Covered Bonds Boosts Lending,
Financial Times 20 (Sept 2, 2009), online at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/bc9aaf24-9726-1 lde-
83c5-00144feabdcO.html (visited Nov 21, 2009). Since the ECB announced its plans to buy 60
billion pounds in covered bonds, the market has roared back to life.
See London Communiqu6 at 4 (cited in note 3) ("We have today therefore pledged to do
whatever is necessary to: restore confidence, growth, and jobs; repair the financial system to
restore lending; strengthen financial regulation to rebuild trust; fund and reform our international
financial institutions to overcome this crisis and prevent future ones; promote global trade and
investment and reject protectionism, to underpin prosperity; and build an inclusive, green, and
sustainable recovery.").
27 'We will fight protectionism. We are committed to bringing the Doha Round to a successful
conclusion in 2010." Pittsburgh Communiqu6, Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, Preamble
28 (Sep 24-25, 2009), online at http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm
(visited Nov 21, 2009). See also London Communiqu6 at 3 (cited in note 3) ("We believe that
the only sure foundation for sustainable globalization and rising prosperity for all is an open
world economy based on market principles, effective regulation, and strong global institutions.");
G20 Declaration, Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy ("Washington Declaration"),
12 (Nov 15, 2008) ("Recognizing the necessity to improve financial sector regulation, we must
avoid over-regulation that would hamper economic growth and exacerbate the contraction of
capital flows, including to developing countries.'), online at
www.g20.org/Documents/g20 summit,-declaration.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
28 See Washington Declaration at 9 (cited in note 27) ("Promoting Integrity in Financial Markets:
We commit to protect the integrity of the world's financial markets by bolstering investor and
consumer protection, avoiding conflicts of interest, preventing illegal market manipulation,
fraudulent activities and abuse, and protecting against illicit finance risks arising from non-
cooperative jurisdictions. We will also promote information sharing, including with respect to
jurisdictions that have yet to commit to international standards with respect to bank secrecy and
transparency."). See also London Communiqu6 at 15 (cited in note 3) ("In particular, we
agree.., to take action against non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens. We stand
ready to deploy sanctions to protect our public finances and financial systems. The era of banking
secrecy is over. We note that the OECD has today published a list of countries assessed by the
Global Forum against the international standard for exchange of tax information.').
Vol 10 No. 2
Emerging Public International Banking Law?
analogous to the policy priorities that established the canon of expectations and
doctrines that we now know as the law of the sea.
The analogy of course is not perfect. A "global commons" concept is
unlikely to evolve and is undesirable with respect to the granting of credit or
financial intermediation conducted among private parties, even if some of those
parties currently operate under substantial government ownership and influence.
One significant cause of the current crisis is found in areas either not regulated
or not sufficiently regulated by governments. In particular, the fraud and abuse
in the US mortgage underwriting business generate understandable cries for
greater government regulation, even if the enforcement of preexisting laws and
regulations in multiple jurisdictions would have done much to decrease the scale
and scope of the crisis.
By articulating common political priorities for the direction that global
regulatory policy should take, the G20 is effectively engaging in the same activity
that policymakers undertook in the early days of the law of the sea: ensuring
vessels (today's financial intermediaries) are "seaworthy" and subject to
jurisdiction at all times. However, practical limits exist on how far a Home state
can exert its jurisdiction. In addition, overly ambitious or aggressive Host state
regulation could undermine the cross-border flow of finance and investment
activities that support global economic growth. This Article asserts that various
informal and pragmatic solutions are being floated by G20 Leaders in an effort
to avoid debilitating and acrimonious negotiations on these sovereign
jurisdictional overlaps between Home and Host states.
If a global common interest emerges to justify common standards, it will
most likely first focus on transparency and access to data rather than adjusting
sovereign interests in entities subject to Home and Host state jurisdiction. As
noted above, cross-border resolution issues are not likely to be addressed in a
common manner soon. However, the vast streams of transaction, counterparty,
and risk exposure data held by financial institutions and their data providers
cross boundaries and oceans literally at the speed of light. The communications
networks that link the providers and users of financial information globally
create the twenty-first century analog to sea-lanes. Global financial policymakers
do not seek to nationalize or appropriate those communication mechanisms
created by private parties. They do not even seek to control the data itself.
Instead, they are declaring a global common interest in acquiring copies of that
data and access to the data streams in order to create "early warning"
mechanisms that can help regulators and international policymakers prevent new
crises.29 In modern democratic societies with access to 3G networks, XBRL
29 See London Communiqu6 at 15 (cited in note 3) ("In particular, we agree ...that the FSB
should collaborate with the LMF to provide early warning of macroeconomic risks and the actions
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technology,3° fiber optic cables and social media, pressures to make more
information available publicly will also increase. Jurisdiction over that data is
unlikely to lose its territorial nexus in the short run.3 Thus, the global commons
interest is likely to emerge with respect to the full stream of anonymous
transactions data designed to protect individual privacy and proprietary secrets
while increasing market transparency.
32
Such data collection and sharing currently occurs in a more limited manner
within the IMF and the BIS, and this has been the case for decades. The novelty
here is that the G20 seeks to increase the scale and scope of information
gathering and sharing in two ways. First, it is empowering the IMF to provide
policymakers with "early warning '' 3  mechanisms so that crises can be averted
going forward. Second, it is endorsing the creation of "colleges of regulators"34
needed to address them; to reshape our regulatory systems so that our authorities are able to
identify and take account of macro-prudential risks; to extend regulation and oversight to all
systemically important financial institutions, instruments, and markets . . .'). None of these
mandates can be implemented without substantial and new data streams flowing into financial
regulators, the FSB, and the IMF. In addition, a broad range of regulatory proposals in the US
and the EU would also significantly expand the kind of market data provided to national
regulators responsible for oversight of hedge funds, private equity funds, and derivatives dealers.
30 See, for example, An Introduction to XBRL, online at www.xbrl.org (visited Nov 21, 2009). XBRL
stands for eXtensible Business Reporting Language. It creates identifying tags for individual data
points, which are computer readable. It "enables automated processing of business information
by computer software, cutting out laborious and costly processes of manual re-entry and
comparison. Computers can treat XBRL data 'intelligently': they can recognize the information in
a XBRL document, select it, analyse it, store it, exchange it with other computers and present it
automatically in a variety of ways for users. XBRL greatly increases the speed of handling of
financial data, reduces the chance of error and permits automatic checking of information" by
anyone with the technology, including individual investors, analysts and financial regulators.
31 See Asaad Siddiqi, Welcome to the City of Bytes? An Assessment of the Traditional Methods
Employed in the International Application of Jurisdiction over Internet Activities-Including a
Critique of Suggested Approaches, 14 NY Intl L Rev 43, 104 (2001) ("the traditional territorial
jurisdiction approaches will indeed survive the internet's exponential growth.').
32 See Pittsburgh Progress Report at T 29 (cited in note 24) ("The use of macro-prudential tools will
require that authorities expand data collection on the financial system. The IMF and FSB have
launched a joint initiative to identify and address data gaps and will submit a report outlining
priorities and work plans to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in November.").
See also id at 28 ("Aside from the work to address procyclicality noted elsewhere, the FSB and
its members are developing quantitative tools to monitor and assess the build-up of macro-
prudential risks in the financial system. These tools aim to improve the identification and
assessment of systemically significant components of the financial sector and the assessment of
how risks evolve over time.").
33 See id at T 4 ("The initial 'dry run' Early Warning Exercise (EWE) was presented to the
International Monetary and Financial Committee (JMFC) meeting in Washington on 15 April
2009. The next iteration of the EWE will be jointly presented to the IMFC meeting in October.').
34 See id at 6 ("Supervisory colleges have now been established for more than thirty large complex
financial institutions identified by the FSF as needing college arrangements. The FSB Standing
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so that regulators can meet and share information with respect to specific
financial intermediaries in an effort to identify systemic vulnerabilities. None of
these functions can occur without the creation of substantially broader common
data reporting and substantially expanded data sharing arrangements across
borders.
This does not mean to suggest that the data sharing process is easy.
Crafting protocols for generating apples-to-apples data sets is laborious and
tedious. Even when technically sound methods for generating globally consistent
data sets can be crafted, they inevitably involve significant costs associated with
changing IT structures and/or requiring all reporting entities to generate new
data fields and reporting streams. In some instances, major differences in legal
and political cultures can create serious impediments to crafting globally agreed
upon standards, particularly in the real estate sector where countries in the civil
law tradition rely on land registries to collect data on mortgage markets in
substantially different ways than common law countries where mortgages are
specific as to both property and person.3" As difficult and costly as the process
may be, the G20 and its constituent parts are firmly committed to increasing and
enhancing global data collection.
At what point do global political activities coalesce into actual international
law? This issue has troubled scholars for centuries. The process of customary
law evolving into positive, codified law has been eloquently described by John
Chipman Gray as follows:
Just as in the history of particular societies there are periods when the
differentiation between law and morality is in the process of becoming
rather than actually being realized-periods when a something which is to
become positive law is being slowly differentiated from positive morality-
so in relation to the society of nations today there is a body of rules in
which a distinction is being established and developed between rules which
must be obeyed, if certain penalties are not to be incurred, and rules which
are merely the expression of international comity and good will. Rules of the
former class . . . are law in becoming-law struggling for existence,
struggling to make itself good . . . If the nations who have united to
establish the [the International Court of Justice] unite to declare that they
will join in carrying out its decrees by force, if necessary, then the rules will
Committee on Supervisory and Regulatory Cooperation, working with standard setters to set out
good practices among supervisory colleges, will report to the G20 ahead of the Finance Ministers
and Governors meeting (November 7-8, 2009).").
35 I am indebted to Ted Truman for reminding me of the difficulties and costs associated with
effecting these kinds of changes. In addition to his experience in this area with the BIS Euro-
Currency Standing Committee (now the Committee on the Global Financial System), I have had
personal experience in crafting common data sets and collection processes when working with
financial engineers to craft and participate in the Quantitative Impact Surveys that formed the
basis for the Basel 2 regulatory capital framework.
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become Law in the strictest sense and each of the nations parties to the
establishment of the court will have legal rights and legal duties. 36
Custom has nonetheless been accepted as a basis for international law in the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.3" It has been described as:
A usage felt by those who follow it to be an obligatory one . . . Evidence
that a custom in this sense exists in the international sphere can be found
only by examining the practice of states; that is to say, we must look at what
states do in their relations with one another and attempt to understand why
they do it, and in particular whether they recognize an obligation to adopt a
certain course. 38
The development and use of customary international law is not limited to
Western legal systems and can be found in most domestic legal systems around
the world, ancient and modern.39 In the international context, state practice can
provide concrete evidence that a given international norm is viewed as having
domestic effect, in addition to treaties and formal domestic legislation.
Two key components merit special attention here. First, customary
international law does not require an international enforcement structure-quite
the opposite. It relies on local or domestic structures to use local legislation
enforcement structures to implement an international standard. Second, the
focus is on the implementation conduct of the states, not on the identity of the
articulating agent. This is consistent with the evolution of the law of the sea in
particular, where international conferences and conventions to articulate
standards are a relatively new development. This analogy is particularly useful in
the financial context, where the vast majority of global standard setters (in fact,
all but the Bank for International Settlements and the Bretton Woods
institutions) lack legal personality.40
The vantage point of history makes it relatively easy to see the evolution of
state practice in the law of the sea context. States increasingly had an interest in
36 John C. Gray, The Nature and Sources ofLaw 131-32 (Gaunt 2d ed 2000).
37 Statute of the International Court ofJustice (1945), Art 38, 59 Stat 1055 (stating that the Court
shall apply international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law).
38 Brierly, Law of Naions at 59-60 (cited in note 6).
39 Alan Watson, The Evolution of Law 43-44 (Johns Hopkins 1985) ("Customary law is not all of a
piece. It operates, for example, among wandering small groups, temporarily settled tribes, rather
small permanent communities, and so on right into economically developed modem Western
societies where there is also much status law."). See also, John P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law
(Michigan 1968).
40 The EU in this context is not an "international standard setter." It does have a limited
international legal personality, but in this context it is more directly analogous to national
legislators and regulators because EU Member States retain many sovereign functions particularly
at the global level. For example, the EU is an equal member of the G20 together with its larger
Member States, but it does not have a voting seat at the IMF or the Basel Committee.
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abiding by and enforcing common standards in the interest of letting commerce
flow. It was relatively straightforward to obtain official endorsement of an
international standard because the rise of the administrative state had not yet
expanded the scope of instrumentalities and agents authorized to act for the
state in some capacity.
The situation in finance is more muddled. Global financial supervisory
standards emerge after closed discussions among regulators that represent the
supervisory interests of their Home jurisdiction. It is unclear whether all
participants in the process are authorized to bind their respective nation-state
during global negotiations. For example, in the US, the Constitution grants the
authority to enter into international agreements to the executive branch,4' and
not all financial regulators are part of executive branch agencies.42 Moreover, all
financial regulators are prohibited from applying domestically any global
regulatory standards without first going through a public "notice and comment"
process.4 3 The status of the global regulatory standard-setters themselves could
also be fairly called into question, as they have no legal personality." One could
also reasonably question whether individual European countries (particularly
those within the eurozone and subject to the Maastricht Treaty) have the
authority to negotiate international agreements internationally or whether instead
the European Commission should represent the EU eurozone Member States in
international discussions.
41 US Const Art II (giving the President the power, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to make treaties).
42 The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission are
technically part of the Legislative Branch of government and they exercise congressionally
delegated authority. The Federal Reserve is a completely independent entity.
43 Administrative Procedures Act, 5 USC § 553 (1946). Note that this is part of the controversy
associated with the Basel Committee's new regulatory capital standard for banks (Basel 2).
Implementation of a new regulatory capital framework for banks negotiated internationally over a
number of years stalled in the US in 2003 in part over allegations that the Federal Reserve and
other independent federal banking regulators had inappropriately finalized the regulatory standard
without complying with the APA.
44 Norton, 43 Intl Law 175 at 181 (cited in note 23) ("Further, we have no formal international
financial regulations notwithstanding an increased need for international collaboration: what we
have are international standard-setting and a few evaluation/assessment/enforcement
tools .... Some even may conjecture that this 'soft' international law/regulation represents an
incipient form of global administrative law (GAL). But, at the end of the day, what comes out of
the international 'sausage-grinder' still are domestic policies, regulations, and administrative
practices, shaped to varying degrees by the GFRNs but to be implemented and enforced by
domestic regulators."). See also Daniel K. Tarullo, Banking on Basel The Future of International
Financial Regulation 2 (Peterson 2008) (Box 1.1: "The (Basel) Committee has no formal legal
existence or permanent staff, and the results of its activities do not have the force of international
law.'). See also Lawrence Boulle, The Law of Globalisaion (Bond 2008).
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A closer look at the most established global standard-setters in the financial
arena demonstrates disparate state practice on the question of whether, for
example, the Basel Committee's regulatory capital standards for banks are
considered customary international law. In Europe, the Basel standard has been
transposed into EU law practically verbatim each time the Basel Committee has
issued the standards and its updates.4" In the US, the original Basel Accord and
the subsequent "Specific Risk Amendment" were incorporated into US federal
banking regulations.46 More recent state practice in Europe and the US does not
support an argument that the Basel regulatory capital standard specifically
represents customary international law. The Basel 2 framework generated
opposition from two US federal banking regulators (the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency),
significant political opposition articulated through various Congressional
hearings and a bill (never passed) designed to deprive the Federal Reserve of the
ability to negotiate future international agreements without a formal US position.
The new capital framework has not yet been implemented in the US even
though it was implemented in Europe in 2006, and it is unclear whether the US
will actually implement the new framework.
7
The US does not seem to be at risk for efforts to compel implementation
of Basel 2 based on a customary law argument. International law recognizes the
rights of a "persistent objector" to avoid being subject to an emerging rule. This
recognition reflects the gradual process by which customary international law
evolves, predicated on the practical recognition that not all states will endorse a
new standard immediately. In Europe, recent efforts by the European
Commission to amend the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) without
45 The original Basel Accord was implemented through the Capital Adequacy Directive, The
updated Basel 2 framework was implemented through the Capital Requirements Directive
("CRD'D.
46 12 CFR Part 208(A); 12 CFR Part 208(E); 12 CFR Part 225(A); 12 CFR 225(E) (paraphrased
from the statutes). Consider, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Application of
Market Risk Capital Requirements to Credit Derivatives, SR 97-18 (June 13, 1997), online at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1997/sr9718.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009).
This letter provides a good history of the US implementation history for the Basel Committee's
regulatory capital requirements and the application of those requirements to a then expanding
universe of financial instruments. It also provides guidance on how credit derivatives held in the
trading account should be treated under the market risk capital requirements by state member
banks and bank holding companies.
47 The US banking regulators have committed to implement Basel 2 in the past, and the G20 leaders
included a commitment to implement Basel 2. However, the G20 leaders also agreed to create a
global leverage ratio which establishes an alternative minimum standard for setting regulatory
capital independent of all risks present on a bank's balance sheet except traditional leverage.
These two regulatory capital frameworks are therefore conceptually at odds with each other and it
is unclear whether both can be implemented as minimum capital standards.
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waiting for global consensus to emerge on the details suggests strongly that the
Basel Committee standard increasingly is not viewed as customary international
law, even among its strongest supporters in the EU.
These considerations enhance the importance of the G20's actions when
seeking to determine whether certain standards are considered customary
international law. As Brierly noted decades ago, "it is possible even today for
new customs to develop and to win acceptance as law when the need is
sufficiently clear and urgent."48 The need to move forward quickly with
internationally agreed normative standards that can deliver stability to the
financial system drives G20 heads of state and governments to empower the
Financial Stability Board, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bank
of International Settlements (BIS) to generate standards and then assess
implementation against those standards. Important constitutional differences
among these entities generally and between the IMF and the BIS are discussed in
greater detail in Section V below.
Importantly, the G20 is creating a process by which standards articulated
by informal groups that have no legal personality (for example, Financial
Stability Board (FSB); Basel Committee; International Organization of Securities
Commissions) are recognized and applied, if not "ratified," by formal, treaty-
based international organizations (IMF; BIS) and political groups (G20). This
adds a layer of legitimacy to the informal global normative process and provides
positive evidence of the intent to rely on the standards generated by the global
policy groups as binding international law. It does not, however, create a
common enforcement mechanism.
The structure here is important, albeit convoluted. The FSB consists of:
finance ministries, central banks, and independent financial supervisors from all
G20 countries; plus the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the
IMF, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), and the BIS; plus the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, the BIS's
Committee on the Global Financial System, the International Accounting
Standards Board, and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors.49
This collection of entities includes a private sector group (IASB), two BIS
committees in addition to the BIS itself, and national authorities.
One could reasonably question whether a group of this size with
substantially different internal mandates and priorities is capable of reaching
solid decisions. The author's experience in working with very large and political
48 Brierly, Law of Nations at 62 (cited in note 6).
49 See links to FSB Members, online at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/members/links.htm
(visited Nov 21, 2009) (listing all the members, including those cited).
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groups suggests that individual projects will be handed to a small group of
"experts" whose conclusions will be endorsed by the broader political group.
While this is a pragmatic way to address difficult technical issues within large
groups, it suggests that the global decision-making process regarding individual
issues could become more difficult to track and potentially less transparent over
time. It will also increase the pressure on the "informal" global standard setters
such as the Basel Committee to deliver standards that can be implemented and
enforced consistently at the national level. Political endorsement by the G20 may
provide an elegant way to achieve this goal short of long-running treaty
negotiations, thus avoiding some of the political pitfalls that emerged in the
process of trying to codify the law of the sea.
The G20 has specifically mandated that "the FSB should collaborate with
the IMF to provide early warning of macroeconomic and financial risks and the
actions needed to address them."5 In other words, the G20 is creating a path by
which informal standards can gain the force of law by incorporating the work of
informal bodies into formal treaty-based entities with real authority to act at the
global level.
We are watching the development of customary international law proceed
at a pace rarely seen before in history. Regardless of the view on the underlying
substantive standards that are emerging, the process itself is impressive. The
question then becomes: how are those standards enforced? As has been noted,
"many treaties and other international declarations are merely empty promises if
nations do not actually enforce them."'"
III. SEALING WAX
Customary practice and gentlemen's agreements function only up to a
point. In any given group, some parties will always seek to push the envelope of
acceptable behavior while others will overtly disregard norms and violate agreed
standards for personal or political gain. This dynamic exists also in the
international law context. Dispute avoidance and dispute resolution are key
reasons for attempting the arduous process of negotiating an international
agreement or treaty. It becomes unavoidable when cross-border enforcement
issues start generating friction.
Again, the law of the sea provides informative guideposts. By the mid-
twentieth century, coastal states sought to exert greater economic rights over
their contiguous sea areas even as technological developments were stretching
50 London Communiqu6 atlI 15 (cited in note 3).
51 John 0. McGinnis, The Comparative Disadvantage of Customary International Law, 30 Harv J L
& Pub Pol 7, 10 (2006).
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these states' effective boundaries above and below the water level. Harnessing
the early twentieth century optimism regarding global treaty-making processes,
the global community then embarked on a series of conventions to codify the
customary law of the sea into treaty-based law with clear allocations of rights
and responsibilities as well as dispute resolution standards for states to
adjudicate differences of opinion.12
Early efforts at codification, including the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea I and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea II, were relatively
uncontroversial. They undertook to translate old-fashioned understandings of
the territorial sea doctrine-delimited traditionally by the distance that a cannon
ball could travel-into modern quantifiable standards (territorial sea = three
miles from shore). Difficulties began in earnest with the third convention, the
UNCLOS III, which pushed the boundaries beyond accepted custom.
UNCLOS III attempts to establish a new international tribunal separate from
the International Court of Justice to hear disputes among ratifying parties. It also
seeks to create a new mechanism for sharing economic wealth gathered from the
deep-sea bed, with a new international administrative body and adjudicative
system. The US still has not ratified the treaty, and it is unclear when ratification
might occur, especially since increased potential economic resources may now
be available under the Arctic Sea.
The experience here is a mixed bag for the G20 and the financial world.
On the one hand, greater clarity and precision in the terms of the law of the sea
have on average decreased disputes and ensured free passage of vessels and
trade. Updated understandings of relative rights and responsibilities with respect
to contiguous areas and the continental shelf have also minimized the potential
for disputes. However, the controversies associated with extending the treaties
to cover issues not yet settled by customary law generate cautionary lessons for
those anxious to proceed quickly to formal international agreements in the
financial area.
The need for greater clarity on rights and responsibilities in the cross-
border financial sector is clear, particularly with respect to failed institutions. The
failure of large cross-border financial firms generates challenges for national
regulators. Local retail depositors and/or customers will seek recompense from
their local or national authorities, not the Home country. Local policymakers are
52 See Brierly, Law of Nations at 207 (cited in note 6) (noting that, in 1945, the Truman proclamations
concerning the continental shelf and the conservation of fisheries had a distinctly unsettling effect
on state practice in regard to coastal waters). A basic description of the UNCLOS history and
ratification status can be found online at www.continentalshelf.org (visited Nov 21, 2009).
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very aware that "unhappy depositors are unhappy voters." 3 National treasuries
must bear the fiscal burden of a significant financial bailout, which tends to
dictate tax and borrowing policies for many years to come. The counterparties
of the failed financial firm potentially face serious shortfalls, as the failed
institution cannot meet its pre-agreed contractual commitments. Further,
corporate clients of the firm face constrained access to credit (and constrained
financial job creation and economic growth). Finally, all market participants face
significantly increased legal and political risk as payment on the failed firm's
contractual obligations becomes subject to the idiosyncratic decisions of a
bankruptcy judge and/or local government administrators.
The same underlying issues that stalled the law of the sea treaty are likely to
generate the same significant challenges and controversy in the financial market
context today of sovereignty and burden sharing. National governments are
unlikely to want to cede authority over their local capital markets to foreign or
international tribunals, particularly if the non-domestic entity is likely to take
decisions that could have a significant adverse impact on the national fiscal
accounts. UNCLOS III has foundered in the US due to the delegation of
authority afforded to the tribunal created to settle disputes, particularly those
with respect to the redistributive economic rights associated with the deep-sea
bed.
Similar issues hover around the G20 process today, making it unlikely that
formal arrangements for dispute resolution and financial regulation
administration will emerge quickly. Two key categories of issues, burden
sharing/dispute resolution and cross-border regulatory authority, demonstrate
the challenge associated with formalizing enforcement standards in the finance
context, particularly before the underlying normative standards have been
agreed.
A. Burden Sharing and Dispute Resolution
Burden sharing and dispute resolution are not new issues for international
bankers.54 While the scale of the problem currently before us is unprecedented,
53 Barbara C. Matthews, The Second Banking Directive: Short-term Choices and Long-Term Goals,
2 DukeJ Comp Intl L 89, 118 (1992).
54 The challenge of cross-border insolvency is also familiar to corporations involved in international
business. Banks present special challenges and so they are the focus of the present article. For a
review of issues that can arise with respect to cross-border insolvencies for non-financial entities,
see Paul J. Omar, Insolvency Laws: An Anglo-French Comparison, 39 Intl Law 107 (2005) (examining
the rules in France and the UK). For a US-EU comparative assessment, see Jonathon L. Howell,
International Insolvengy Law, 42 Intl Law 113 (2008) (discussing international insolvencies, Section
304 of the Code, the development of a unified insolvency doctrine, the Model Law, and the
European Insolvency Regulation, and the recently enacted Chapter 15).
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policymakers and bankers have seen this problem in the recent past.55 Not only
did they have Bank Herstatt to unwind in the 1970s, but the Latin American
debt crisis generated the largest bank failures of its day (notably, Continental
Bank). More recently, the closure of the criminal Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (BCCI) in London generated policy debate on the urgent need for
an international insolvency regime for large global banks.56 Nothing was done.
In the current crisis alone, financial firms in Iceland, Germany (IKB;
Sachsen), the UK (Lloyds Bank; Northern Rock; Royal Bank of Scotland) and
the US (most notably, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG) have all failed
or have been taken over by Home state governments to forestall catastrophic
financial system failure. In addition, a mutual fund administered by a French
bank (BNP Paribas) failed and the bank halted trading in its shares at the
beginning of the crisis in August 2007. The ripple effects across financial market
counterparties, corporate clients, and retail customers have been significant. This
Section discusses the cross-border impact of financial firms' failures on
customers and governments.
Affected customers routinely and appropriately seek restitution from
governments for their losses when financial institutions of all kinds (not just
banks) fail. They have varying degrees of success. Success is usually strongly
correlated with the availability of any residual cash or assets left inside their
domestic jurisdiction. Can depositors, investors, and customers obtain
restitution from foreign governments/regulatory authorities or parent entities
abroad after a financial firm has collapsed? This issue is currently being litigated
in two different contexts.
First, Spanish investors have also sought (unsuccessfully so far) restitution
from the US for losses resulting from investment with scam artist Bernard
Madoff. Some negotiated solution is possible. Fraud-based enforcement actions
For a good summary of this history, see Lawrence Baxter, The Internationalization of Law: The
"Complex" Case of Bank Regulation, forthcoming in William Van Caenegem and Mary E.
-iscock, eds, The Internationlisation of Law; Legislating, Decision-Making, Practice and
Education (Edward Elgar 2010) (characterizing the emerging pattern of international banking
regulation).
56 See Reducing the Risks of International Insolvenfy; A Compendium of Work in Progress (Group of Thirty
2000) (noting that the financial crises of the mid-1990s underscored the need for a global dialogue
on the financial stakes presented by cross-border insolvencies). The Compendium is intended to be
a complete and accurate portrait of the ongoing efforts of major international financial
institutions and organizations, both public and private, in the area of insolvency reform. See also
International Insolvencies in the Financial Sector Study Group Report (Group of Thirty 1998) (arguing that
the Asian financial crisis demonstrated the need for stronger national insolvency laws and
heightened awareness of the dangers of cross-border insolvency). This report examines the issues
surrounding cross-border insolvency in the financial sector, and makes recommendations for
regulators, administrators, legislators and financial firms.
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against other hedge funds and investment funds in the US may generate
increased interest by investors to seek restitution as well.
Second, in the case of the Lehman Brothers failure, payouts will be
assessed by the judicial system because the firm entered into bankruptcy
administration in September 2008 in two different jurisdictions: New York and
London. Administration procedures will continue for years as the two relevant
bankruptcy courts attempt to sort out which contractual obligations will be paid
in which geographical location from which pools of assets. The conflicts of law
discipline will doubtless be stretched in the process.
Regardless of which authorities ultimately are responsible for paying
claims, the point remains the same: national treasuries and central banks remain
responsible for maintaining financial system stability and ensuring that key
counterparties and customers do not bear the burden of a financial firm's failure.
It is a tall order with significant implications for taxation and public debt
overhangs. These are profoundly political decisions taken by national authorities
knowing full well that unhappy depositors make unhappy voters.
Devising a cross-border dispute and insolvency resolution system that
generates certainty of outcome for financial market participants (including
consumers) while respecting national sovereign priorities to protect taxpayer
funds is proving to be challenging at best. Therefore, while a cross-border
resolution authority solution would be desirable, it seems highly unlikely to
evolve either as custom or more formal arrangements in the near future at the
global level. As noted in note 25, the G20 itself seeks to mandate private sector
solutions with the hope of minimizing the risk of fiscal payouts and bailouts in
the future.
The unique cross-border nature of the EU57 makes it conceptually possible
for policymakers to consider crafting a joint burden-sharing framework, at least
with respect to financial firms headquartered in the eurozone. Policymakers in
Brussels made this issue a priority following the onset of the financial crisis in
2007,8 but progress has stalled. EU member states are reluctant to make
57 For a good description of the overlapping and unique legal authorities created within the EU
structure (and their implications for international engagements), see Charles T. Kotuby, Jr,
External Competence of the European Communiy in the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
Communi y Harmonization and Worldwide Unification, 15 NY Ind L Rev 99 (2002) (addressing the new
Community competence stemming from Articles 61 and 65, and the approach that the
Community has taken to utilize conflict of law as an integrating tool).
58 In October 2007, EU finance ministers and central bank governors sitting in Council formation
agreed to negotiate amongst themselves a Memorandum of Understanding ("MoU") that would
include, among other things, "common practical guidelines for crisis management to reflect a
common understanding of the steps and procedures that need to be taken in a cross-border
situation." They also identified in Annex I "Common Principles for Cross-Border Financial Crisis
Management." Council of the European Union press release 13571/01 (Luxembourg, Oct 9,
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commitments to bail out depositors or counterparties in other countries ex ante,
particularly when the full scale of potential liabilities is unknown and while the
public finances in EU member states continue to deteriorate.
Two commentators recently proposed the creation of a temporary EU-
level authority to facilitate disposition and administration of toxic assets from
European bank balance sheets. The proposal is far less ambitious than
establishing a permanent process for resolving cross-border insolvencies. And
yet it is not gaining much political traction since the establishment of such an
entity as proposed would require that the EU-level authority hold "bank equity
and other assets purchased by national governments in the restructurings on
account for them." It would also contemplate ex ante capital allocation
agreements among state participants and greater transparency about the State's
own banking systems.59
If the EU cannot make arrangements to share the financial burden across
borders when they have pre-existing treaty obligations to share sovereignty and
support a common currency,6 ° how can the more loosely organized G20 create
burden-sharing mechanisms? Some possible emerging tools are discussed in the
last Section of this article.
B. Cross-Border Regulatory Authority
A basic tenet of international law is that a nation-state's jurisdiction and
authority are located in its territory. This authority cannot be exercised beyond
its territory without impinging on the rights and obligations of other nation-
states. However, the world is more complex than this principle suggests. As
noted, the law of the sea delineates the many places where a coastal state's
authority may extend beyond its three-mile territorial sea. The main areas where
jurisdiction expands beyond the territory relate to economic interests above,
within, and below the sea as well as with respect to foreign flag vessels seeking
to navigate, dock, and undertake commerce with the coastal state. With respect
to the latter category, Host state jurisdictional overrides can be justified based on
the need to protect the local populace and to respect local territorial authority.
2007). The text of the MoU is not publicly available. However, a March 2009 presentation by an
IMF staff member available publicly concludes that the "MoU and ECOFIN crisis management
principles not of obvious help" in addressing cross-border resolution issues. The presentation is
available online at www.imf.org/extemal/np/seminars/eng/2009/eurfin/pdf/fontey.pdf (visited
Nov 21, 2009). One likely source of weakness: relative responsibilities for allocating fiscal burdens
are not spelled out in the publicly available Council documents.
59 Adam S. Posen and Nicolas Veron, A Solution for Europe's Banking Problem, Peterson Institute
Policy Brief PB09-136, 8 (June 2009).
60 See, for example, Treaty of Rome, 298 UN Treaty Ser 11 (1957); Maastricht Treaty, 31 ILM 247
(1992).
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As noted earlier in this Article, international supervisory bodies were
created over the last thirty years to facilitate cross-border coordination and
cooperation among financial regulators. The increased rate and significance of
cross-border financial flows across the Atlantic Ocean,6' passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act during the early part of this decade,62 and the aggressive use
of "equivalency" requirements by the EU for access to European capital
markets," created an intense political debate about whether and how Home
country supervisors could conduct onsite or other inspections beyond the
territorial limits of the Home state. For the past decade, financial supervisors
particularly at the transatlantic level have been struggling with how to safeguard
their local systems knowing that they must rely on other supervisors for daily
oversight of increasingly complex financial activities and risk exposures.6 4 This
has generated debate over regulatory jurisdiction and authority, with the terms
"mutual recognition,"" "equivalence,"" "substituted compliance," ' 67  and
61 See Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, eds, Deep Integration: How Transatlantic Markets are
Leading Globalization (Johns Hopkins and the Centre for European Policy Studies 2005). See in
particular Chapter 9 on the transatlantic regulatory policy debates during the earlier pre-crisis part
of this decade.
62 Id at 126 (the issue regarding auditor oversight results from the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act in the US).
63 Id at 126-27 (discussing various equivalence agreements). See also Directive 2004/109/EC, Art
23(4), OJ L390/38 (Dec 31, 2004) (requiring the European Commission to determine whether
non-EU accounting standards are "equivalent" to EU standards created in that directive. Failure
to issue an equivalence determination results in securities offered by companies in non-
conforming countries to be barred from the EU after a transition period.).
64 The US-EU Economic Relationship: What Comes Next?, Hearing before the US House of
Representatives Financial Services Committee, Domestic & International Subcommittee (June 8,
2005) (this hearing will allow the members of the subcommittee to hear from industry wimesses
in highlighting areas of improvement needed in the US-EU dialogue in trade convergence and
access to capital); The US-EU Regulatory Dialogue: The Private Sector Perspective, Hearing
before the US House of Representatives Financial Services Committee, Domestic & International
Subcommittee (June 17, 2004) (hearing from those who are not official parties to the dialogue
between financial regulators on both sides of the Atlantic); The US-EU Regulatory Dialogue and
its Future, Hearing before the US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services
(May 13, 2004) (evaluating the US-EU dialogue on the EU's financial services action plan and its
implications for America's financial services industry over the past two years).
65 Mutual recognition in the EU prohibits Member States from barring entry/free passage of goods
of services produced in another EU member state so long as the goods or services were produced
lawfully in the Home State, even if those Home laws are different and generate technically
different goods and services than might otherwise be permitted in the receiving Host state. See
EU Council Resolution of Oct 28 1999 on Mutual Recognition, OJ C141 (May 5, 2000).
66 Directive 2003/71 /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (Nov 4, 2003) (amending
Directive 2001/34/EC, Art 20) (on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to
the public or admitted to trading); Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/2004 (Apr 29, 2004)
(implementing Directive 2003/71 /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards
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"extraterritoriality" thrown around with increasing abandon. In all cases,
regulatory authorities seek to define areas where it might be appropriate to rely
on foreign supervisory authorities without giving away too much sovereignty or
rights of action.
The current financial crisis has not eliminated this debate; it has only
pushed the debate to the background. In part, this reflects political pragmatism.
Regulators in Europe and the US realize they cannot seek to rely on foreign
regulatory regimes when confidence in all regulatory regimes is at an all time
low, and for good reason. With the possible exception of Canada, no major
financial services regulatory system has covered itself in glory.
In Germany, regulators missed growing concentrations of risk and risk
management failures at IKB and Sachsen. In the UK, the new and hyper-
sophisticated Financial Services Authority (FSA) missed a most basic problem at
Northern Rock, namely mismatched maturities between assets and liabilities.
The FSA also failed to exercise adequate supervision over the London subsidiary
of AIG, which stood at the epicenter of the credit derivatives business. In
France, supervisors, compliance officers, and external auditors failed to detect
the fraudulent trades conducted by a rogue trader. The positions taken by the
trader were of such magnitude that their unwinding had a direct impact on
monetary policy decisions made by the Federal Reserve. In the US, all regulatory
information contained in prospectuses as well as the format, incorporation by reference and
publication of such prospectuses and dissemination of advertisements); Directive 2004/109/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council (Dec 15, 2004) (on the harmonization of
transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted
to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC). These legislative texts
permit foreign firms to use the EU prospectuses and other disclosures and offering documents if
the European Commission and the EU-level regulatory committees such as the Committee of
European Securities Regulators ("CESR") determine that such foreign standards are "equivalent"
to those established at EU level. The resulting "equivalence determinations" have evolved into
highly developed political theater, especially at the transatlantic level. A good example of how
convoluted the "equivalence determinations" can become can be found online at
www.cesr.eu/popup2.php?id=3481 (visited Nov 21, 2009). Committee of European Securities
Regulators, Technical Advice on Equivalence of Certain Third Country GAAP and on
Description of Certain Third Countries Mechanisms of Enforcement of Financial Information,
CESR/05-230 b (June 2005), online at www.cesr.eu/popup2.php?id=3481 (visited Nov 21, 2009)
(holding that certain countries GAAPs are equivalent to IFRS subject to certain requirements).
67 Howell E. Jackson, A System of Selective Substitute Compliance, 48 Harv Intl LJ 105 (2007) (examining
the Tafara and Peterson Framework); Ethiopis Tafara and Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprintfor Cross-
border Access to US Investors: A New International Framework, 48 Harv Intl L J 31 (2007) (proposing a
new framework to apply foreign financial service providers accessing the US capital market). As a
practical matter, substituted compliance and mutual recognition generate the same outcome: free
entry of foreign items without compliance with local law. The difference is that substituted
compliance contemplates that the receiving state reserves the right to require domestic
compliance in the event that the sending state fails to exercise appropriate oversight and require
compliance at Home.
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agencies at the federal and state levels failed to detect major defects in risk
management systems and underwriting practices across all parts of the financial
system: banks, investment banks, broker-dealers, hedge funds, mutual funds,
insurance companies, mortgage originators. This is not the time to ask
policymakers and politicians to trust another country's regulatory system,
particularly when potentially huge sums of taxpayer funds will be used to redress
failings in another country's oversight of its financial system.
And yet, devolving to a Host-state dominated paradigm would be
disastrous to economic growth. If hard times continue, Host states could find it
difficult to resist domestic political pressure to impose burdensome and
discriminatory requirements on the local operations of foreign financial firms.
The creation of competitive advantages for local firms would likely be offset by
a corresponding decrease in competition and availability of finance for a broad
range of economic actors.
As noted earlier in this Article, the G20 rejects on paper the potential
growth of mercantilist, protectionist, or autarkic systems. Instead, focuses
political attention at the technical level by supporting the creation of "colleges"
of supervisors that can share information across borders in a confidential
manner so as to create "early warning" systems.68 These informal, ad hoc
activities stretch the boundaries of permissible sovereign activity in reciprocal
ways. If all regulators share information with each other, then each regulator
simultaneously cedes sovereignty in a manner that is evenhanded. Work in this
direction was well underway in the EU, the Basel Committee,69 and I0SC0 70
68 Group of Twenty Leaders CommuniquE, 5 (Washington DC Nov 2008), online at
http://www.g20.org/Documents/g2CLsummit-declaration.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009) (the IMF
and the FSF should strengthen their collaboration and conduct early warning exercises); EU
Economic and Financial Affairs Council ("ECOFIN") Roadmap of December 4, 2007, 12
(inviting Level 3 Committees to monitor the coherence of the practices of different colelges of
supervisors); EU Council Conclusions May 4, 2008; Committee of European Banking Supervisors
("CEBS") and Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
("CEIOPS"); Colleges of Supenisors-lO Common Principles (Jan 27, 2009), online at
http://www.ceiops.eu/media/ files/publicadons/standardsandmore/recommendatons/CEBS-
CEIOPS-IWCFC-10-principles-colleges-of-supervisors.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009) (ten common
principles are presented as relevant for the banking, insurance and financial conglomerates sector
regarding the functioning of the Colleges of supervisors).
69 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Results of the 2008 Loss Data Collection Exercise (July
2009), online at www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl60.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009) ("The 2008 Loss Data
Collection Exercise (LDCE) is the first international LDCE to collect information on all four data
elements that are used in the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) for operational risk in the
Basel II Framework-internal loss data, external loss data, scenario analysis and business
environment and internal control factors (BEICFs).").
70 International Organization of Securities Commissions, Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding
Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and Exchange of Information, International Organizations of
Securities Commissions (May 2002), online at http://www.sec.gov/about/
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before the crisis. These efforts have gained momentum in the year since the
2008 autumn market meltdown. They also provide an additional concrete
example of customary state practice and evolving international law regarding the
obligations to increase cross-border transparency in the financial sector, at least
among official sector parties.
However, these informal arrangements fail to address the enforcement
issue. Even with colleges of supervisors, there is little hope that participants will
enforce identified weaknesses with vigor. No obligation exists to compel
enforcement. Past experience does not engender confidence that such informal
gentlemen's agreements will suffice to enforce standards, particularly if the Host
country in question does not agree with the standards or would have to provide
significant taxpayer funding to resolve the problem.71 Clarity, predictability, and
certainty of outcome are crucial for the smooth functioning of markets. These
elements are lacking in a world where ad hoc groupings of regulators can meet
in one formation to discuss and agree on action plans with respect to one
financial institution, and meet in a separate formation with different participants
to discuss a different financial institution. Joint enforcement actions are not
likely to work smoothly where the economic impact of a given enforcement
action are spread unevenly. More formal mechanisms for joint law enforcement
activities (letters rogatory, for example)7 2 are not likely to be useful tools because
they take years to negotiate and implement. Financial markets require faster
action.
Finally, the history of the law of the sea suggests that more formal treaty-
based agreements spelling out enforcement jurisdiction and possibly even joint
adjudication procedures are highly unlikely to evolve. Another, more basic,
consideration also militates against treaty-based arrangements in these areas.
Financial supervision is the purview of largely independent regulators, finance
ministries, and sometimes central banks. If formal international agreements or
offices/oia/oiabilatera!/iosco.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009). This instrument has its roots in
facilitating mutual legal assistance following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US.
71 To provide a sense of scale, the European Commission estimates that the amount of state
support to European banks between October 2008 and July 2009 that has so far been approved by
the Commission's competition regulator amounts to one-third of GDP for the entire EU. This
amount is split between 313 billion Euros in direct capital injections and 2.9 trillion Euros in
guarantees. At the individual country level in states hardest hit by the crisis, the proportion is
more staggering. For example, Ireland's support for its banking sector represents 231.8 percent of
GDP.
72 A "letter rogatory" is "a formal request from a court in which an action is pending, to a foreign
court to perform some judicial act . . . in United States usage, letters rogatory have been
commonly utilized only for the purpose of obtaining evidence." 22 CFR Part 92, § 92.54
("'Letters rogatory' defined"), online at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2006/aprqtr/pdf/
22cfr92.54.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
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treaties are to be negotiated either bilaterally or multilaterally, each nation's
diplomatic service will likely take over the negotiations, which could last years.
Neither financial market participants nor the affected finance ministries and
regulators have an incentive to cede negotiating authority to non-specialists that
might not appreciate key structural differences between financial institutions and
sectors across jurisdictions and might therefore undertake political horse-trading
with respect to arcane regulatory policy concepts.
If reaching agreement on enforcement matters is so difficult, one might
reasonably question whether formality is really required. Can the financial system
continue to function with customary international law evolving over time as the
needs of the market and sovereigns evolve (even during a crisis)? In the short-
run, the answer is probably yes, largely because there is no choice. However, in
the longer run the inevitable trajectory is towards formality and codification.73
This Article suggests the glide path is clear. The IMF has the potential to evolve
into an enforcement agent at least with respect to data collection and global
systemic risk detection; the technical global standard-setters are evolving into
articulators of customary international law norms.
IV. CABBAGES
Over the last twenty years, a relatively quiet revolution has occurred in the
way that risks are intermediated. That revolution has been global, and has
challenged the ability of all financial regulators to keep pace and to exercise their
jurisdiction. 4 Financial instruments designed thousands of years ago to help
farmers hedge their agricultural commodity risk have been turbo-charged by
computing and telecommunications technology.7" The structure and
mathematics supporting modern finance may be complex and flawed. This is not
the place to describe in detail the evident flaws in risk management, risk
modeling, asset valuation, and underwriting. For purposes of this Article, it is
sufficient merely to note that modern risk management and modeling have
73 See McGinnis, 30 HarvJ L & Pub Pol 7 (2006) (cited in note 51).
74 See Group of Thirty: Study Group on Supervision and Regulation, Global Institutions, National
Supervision and Systemic Risk (Group of Thirty 1997) (the threat of serious disruption to the
international financial system is small, but is nonetheless a serious concern).
7 See Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management 233
(Random House 2000) ("Long-Term put supreme trust in diversification---one of the shibboleths
of modern investment, but an overrated one. As Keynes noted, one bet soundly considered is
preferable to many poorly understood."). Consider Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The
Remarkable Stogy of Risk (Wiley & Sons 1996); Gregory J. Millman, The Vandal's Crown: How Rebel
Curreny Traders Overthrew the World's Central Banks (Simon & Schuster 1995).
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permitted formerly illiquid credit risk to become traded.76 The G20 seeks to find
ways to constrain but not eliminate this activity.
Creating a world in which credit can be and is traded across borders creates
a web of interrelationships among a broad range of economic actors that no
global policy group can untangle without unleashing additional volatility and
damage into the financial system. Financial market participants trade credit
derivatives alongside other derivatives, debt securities, and equity securities at a
scale and with a speed that is difficult to appreciate. Trading houses compete
with each other regarding the placement of their servers in relation to the servers
at exchanges in order to shave off nanoseconds from execution times. These
transactions link globally disparate counterparties together not just as
counterparties but also as individuals with a stake in the resilience of the system.
The growth of global commerce, denominated in dollars, has also
generated significant counterparty credit exposures through trading channels
that do not rely on derivatives. Currently, the vast majority of global trade is
invoiced in US dollars so that the companies involved in the transaction do not
have to assume the cross-currency risk of exchange rate fluctuations between the
time that goods are purchased and delivered. Banks that underwrite those
transactions thus acquire dollar obligations. In order to fund their dollar-based
business, BIS research has shown that European banks became major purchases
of US money market mutual fund (MMMF) assets.77 This is a key example of
credit support activities being conducted through trading channels, rather than
those of traditional banking. It is a key support function for the global supply
chain, and is part of the so-called "shadow banking system." It was not well
understood until 2008 that such exposures could be subject to payment
interruption similar to those experienced by market participants when Bank
Herstatt failed to pay its foreign exchange rate obligations in New York in the
early 1970s.
The G20 policymakers recognize that disentangling the web of
interrelationships is inadvisable. Their action plan (as with the action plans in
various member countries, including the US, and other jurisdictions, like the
76 See John B. Caouette, Edward I. Alman, and Paul Narayanan, Managing Credit Risk: The Next Great
Financal Challenge 354 (Wiley & Sons 1998); Michael K. Ong, Credit Ratings: Methodologies, Rationale
and Default Risk (RISK 2002); Dwight B. Crane, et al, The Global Financial System: A Functional
Perspective, 108-109 (Harvard Bus 1995). Consider Michael K. Ong, Internal Credit Risk Models:
Capital Allocation and Pe formance Measurement (RISK 1999); Credit Derivatives: Kfy Issues (British
Bankers 1997).
77 Nachiko Baba, Robert McCauley, and Srichander Ramaswamy, US Dollar Money Market Funds and
Non-US Banks, BIS Quarterly Review 65-70 (March 2009). Patrick McGuire and Gotz von Peter,
The US Dollar Shortage in Global Banking and the International Poliy Response (BIS Working Paper No
291) (October 2009) (discussing European banks' need for US dollar funding), online at
www.bis.org/publ/work291.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009).
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EU) seeks merely to make a derivative space function with more safeguards and
limits. Increased capital requirements for banks and other intermediaries,
centralized counterparty clearing arrangements, limitations on large order block
execution in so-called "dark pools" and on hedge fund activities, and potential
bans on flash trading and short selling (to name but a few of the policy initiatives
underway) will change the structure and flexibility of the financial system going
forward. One can debate whether increased rigidity in counterparty relationships
and the creation of incentives against knowing one's counterparty and relying
instead on a clearinghouse are appropriate ways to strengthen risk management.
As noted in this Article, the broader point is that the clearly stated goal of the
policymakers is to make the system function better, not to outlaw particular
instrument types.
If the G20 keeps to these goals in the months and years ahead, global
financial market integration can only increase. The number of internationally
active intermediaries will shrink as hard times continue to force out competitors.
The number of counterparties technically also will dwindle dramatically as a
growing proportion of derivatives transactions are required to clear through a
central counterparty and, potentially, be traded on a formal exchange. Replacing
bilateral counterparty relationships with central clearing means that each
financial firm will have only a handful of bilateral central counterparties for its
derivatives transactions. Ironically, efforts to eliminate weaknesses associated
with faulty and opaque links among bilateral counterparties will create
concentrations of credit exposures at a small number of central clearing
locations. It could also have the unintended consequence of decreasing the
incentives for financial firms to assess the creditworthiness of their
counterparties because their relationship going forward will be predominantly
with the central counterparty.
The oversight of this smaller group of large central counterparty
institutions with cross-border reach and risk exposures will also fall on a
shrinking number of countries that host such sophisticated and centralized
trading activities. This can only increase the need for policy coordination and
enforcement cooperation. As the number of systemic risk institutions shrinks
and as their asset sizes grow, regulators from other countries will want
assurances not just about "exit strategies" but also about whether and how
enforcement actions will occur.
The potential for cross-border differences of view regarding enforcement
is great. This risk will be exacerbated if government ownership and capital
support in financial firms continues for extended periods. Such relationships will
blur further the line between private sector and public sector interests in
financial sector health. Attitudes about the appropriate approach for
enforcement actions are highly dependent on the local legal system. For
example, the US treats certain violations of banking and securities laws as
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criminal offenses. The same is not true in Europe or other parts of the world.
Where enforcement actions require extradition for prosecution, conflicts and
controversy can emerge. In Europe, policymakers favor negotiated solutions
where possible. This can complicate regulatory action, particularly in situations
where a financial institution needs to be closed quickly.78 Increased regulatory
interaction among supervisors from different regulatory traditions within the
colleges may perversely increase friction over operational differences much as
the negotiating history of the UNCLOS treaties increased the acrimony and
disdain among the negotiating parties over time. The regulatory and political
risks that financial firms must now manage will ironically grow exponentially as a
direct consequence of increased global cooperation and communication among
regulators.
The need for certainty of outcome will generate market pressure for more
formal commonly agreed standards at the international level. Modern experience
and controversy regarding UNCLOS' proposed international enforcement
mechanisms suggests that evolutionary approaches stand the best chance of
garnering real engagement and buy-in across borders rather than top-down
approaches agreed at international conferences designed to create binding
agreements based on wishful thinking rather than actual practice.
V. KINGS
What kind of enforcement arrangements could G20 leaders devise? As
noted, formal treaty-based solutions and global adjudicatory processes are likely
to be cumbersome, slow, and controversial to implement. Financial markets
move too fast for such instruments to be appropriate or realistic. The first three
G20 summits suggest that the outlines of emerging customary practice are in the
field of enforcement. Those outlines focus on classically sovereign financial
authorities to raise and spend funds and emphasize the one international
organization that already has the authority to enforce some standards and
agreements globally, the IMF.
Two international organizations exist in the financial arena today: the IMF
and the BIS. They bring together global finance ministers (IMF) and central
bank governors (BIS) in a global setting, also reinforcing traditional splits
between finance ministers and their central banking counterparts. The IMF has a
broader mandate and formal authority to imposed sanctions on its Members
In the US, banks are closed on Fridays after the close of business by the FDIC and reopened on
Mondays so as to minimize disruption in the financial system. No similar structure exists in the
EU today. As a consequence, European policymakers are more likely to nationalize or make
massive capital infusions into large financial institutions because they have no way of
administering a cross-border failure inside Europe.
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than the BIS. More importantly, the IMF is a full international organization in
which participation is governed by treaty, and so it is the focus of this Section.
The BIS has a more convoluted history and more limitations, which make it an
unlikely candidate to evolve into a G20 enforcement agent, at least with respect
to formal sanctioning powers against sovereign states.
The BIS was created to facilitate cross-border payments between central
banks by acting as an agent for participating central banks.7 9 Its purpose is to
"promote the co-operation of central banks and to provide additional facilities
for international financial operations; and to act as trustee or agent in regard to
international settlements entrusted to it under agreements with the parties
concerned."80 It has no formal authority to exercise oversight or enforcement
actions over member central banks. It is best understood as a forum for central
banks to compare notes and effectuate payments.
The BIS was created first by a treaty between the governments of
Germany, Belgium, France, the UK, Italy, and Switzerland.8 The US is not a
party to this treaty, nor are the other countries that have subsequently joined the
BIS. Instead, the US membership is traced to a parallel "constituent charter"
which notes that the US and three private commercial banks contributed the
start-up capital for the bank.82 It operates with many of the attributes of an
"international organization" as that term is understood in international law with
respect to certain immunities, including tax immunity.83 But it is not an entity to
79 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Fedpoints, online at
www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed (visited Nov 21, 2009) ("Established in 1930 in Basel,
Switzerland, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is a bank for central banks. It takes
deposits from and provides a wide range of services to central banks, and through them, to the
international financial system. The BIS also provides a forum for international monetary
cooperation, consultation, and information exchange among central bankers; conducts monetary,
economic, and financial research, and acts as an agent or trustee for international financial
settlements."). Because it operates only as agents for central bank principals, the BIS does not
appear to be a major participant in the central bank swap arrangements crafted in 2007 to address
the onset of the financial crisis. See Maguire and Peter, US Dollar Shortage at 19 (cited in note 77)
(showing the central bank network of swap lines).
80 Bank for International Settlements, Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements, Art 3 (2003)
("The objects of the Bank are: to promote the co-operation of central banks and to provide
additional facilities for international financial operations; and to act as trustee or agent in regard to
international financial settlements entrusted to it under agreements with the parties concerned."),
online at www.bis.org/about/statut.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009). The original treaty was crafted in
1930 as the Bank was created to facilitate war reparations payments from Germany to England
and France.
81 Convention Respecting the Bank for International Settlements (Jan 20, 1930), online at
www.bis.org/about/convention-en.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
82 Constituent Charter of the Bank for International Settlements 3 (Jan 20, 1930), online at
www.mnb.hu (visited Nov 21, 2009).
83 Id at 4-5.
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which the US holds treaty obligations on par with the other international
financial institutions, including the IMF.84 The US is thus a shareholder in the
institution, which was created and remains an agent of the central bank members
who contribute to its operations. The remainder of this article thus focuses on
the IMF.
The IMF treaty makes clear that the international financial institution is
responsible not just for promoting international cooperation, but also for
providing, among other things, "the machinery for consultation and
collaboration on international monetary problems," for facilitating "the
expansion and balanced growth of international trade and to contribute thereby
to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real
income," and for shortening "the duration and .. .degree of disequilibrium in
the international balances of payments of members.""5 In the event that the IMF
provides emergency resources to member countries, the Articles of Agreement
entitle it to render opinions on local economic policies and require changes. 86
The IMF also has the authority to request, and member states have the
obligation to provide to the IMF, a broad range of economic, financial, and
clearing arrangement information for the IMF to assess.87 The "Article IV"
84 See United States Department of State, Treaties in Force (Jan 1, 2009), online at
www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/treaties/2009/index.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009). The treaties
establishing the Bretton Woods international financial institutions are included in that
compendium. The documents establishing the BIS are not because those documents are neither
international agreements nor treaties.
85 IMF Articles of Agreement, Art 1, online at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm
(visited Nov 21, 2009). The IMF also famously is responsible for promoting "exchange stability"
and maintaining "orderly exchange arrangements among members and to avoid competitive
exchange depreciation." Id. The foreign exchange component of its authorities has been the
subject of much discussion. The implications are left for another article focused on economics.
86 Id at Art V, Section 2a ("The Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its general resources,
including policies on stand-by or similar arrangements, and may adopt special policies for special
balance of payments problems, that will assist members to solve their balance of payments
problems in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Agreement and that will establish
adequate safeguards for the temporary use of the general resources of the Fund.").
87 Id at Art VIII, Section 5 (The fund may require members to furnish it with such information as it
deems necessary for its activities). This authority was recently strengthened and expanded by the
IMF Board. See IMF Decision No 13182-(04/10), Jan 30, 2004, as amended by Decision Nos
13814-(06/98), November 15, 2006, 13849-(06-108), Dec 20, 2006 and 14107-(08/38), May 2,
2008 ("IMF VII1 expansion"). See also IMF Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 4/10
(February 23, 2004); IMF Public Information Notice 6/95 (August 10, 2006); and IMF Public
Information Notice (PIN) No. 08/60 (May 27, 2008) ("In addition, in cases of severe deficiencies
and where staff have had to construct key data based on limited information, staff should discuss
with the authorities specific and prioritized remedial measures, and should report on this
discussion... In cases of non-provision of data, most Directors agreed that there should be no
delay in implementing the formal procedures specified under the 2004 Decision including the
"letter stage" where management notifies the member of its intention to inform the Board of a
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reviews and the IMF's Article VIII ability to compel information from member
countries have been interpreted liberally over the years and include voluntary
assessments of non-client countries under the "Financial Sector Assessment
Program.'"88
The IMF is interpreting liberally its G20 mandate to create mechanisms
that would permit it to establish "early warning" systems so that risks cannot in
the future build up in the financial system. The IMF warned for years of growing
global imbalances that effectively were sending "hot money" from China and the
Middle East to the US. The IMF's traditional enforcement mechanisms have
focused on establishing conditions for the granting of emerging assistance. This
ex post arrangement can create incentive problems and make the IMF
ineffective in preventing problems when local national interests do not coincide
with IMF recommendations. It also faced the challenge that policy prescriptions
appropriate in one context might not fit another country's financial situation.89
Until recently, it had no authority to compel remedial action from non-
borrowers.
The IMF is now crafting a range of mechanisms to compel action by
member states, regardless of whether they are borrowing from its facilities. Two
merit particularly close attention: Article VIII revisions and the Memoranda of
Understanding (MoU).
breach of obligation-once the criteria for moving to the letter stage are met, namely where the
data are not provided and the member appears to have the capacity to provide the data.").
88 See International Monetary Fund, Financial Sector Assessment Program, online at
www.imf.org/external/NP/fsap/fsap.asp (visited Nov 21, 2009):
"Resilient, well-regulated financial systems are essential for macroeconomic and
financial stability in a world of increased capital flows. The FSAP, a joint IMF and
World Bank effort introduced in May 1999, aims to increase the effectiveness of
efforts to promote the soundness of financial systems in member countries.
Supported by experts from a range of national agencies and standard-setting
bodies, work under the program seeks to identify the strengths and vulnerabilities
of a country's financial system; to determine how key sources of risk are being
managed; to ascertain the sector's developmental and technical assistance needs;
and to help prioritize policy responses. Detailed assessments of observance of
relevant financial sector standards and codes, which give rise to Reports on
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) as a by-product, are a key
component of the FSAP. The FSAP also forms the basis of Financial System
Stability Assessments (FSSAs), in which IMF staff address issues of relevance to
IMF surveillance, including risks to macroeconomic stability stemming from the
financial sector and the capacity of the sector to absorb macroeconomic shocks."
See also International Monetary Fund, Factsbeet on The Financial Sector Assessment Program (Sep 29,
2009), online at www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fsap.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009) (the focus
of FSAP assessments is twofold: (1) to gauge the stability of the financial sector and (2) to assess
its potential contribution to growth and development).
89 See Lex Rieffel, Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The CaseforAd Ho Machinegy, 260-87 (Brookings 2003).
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A. Article VIII Revisions
The IMF in 2004 updated its information gathering activities and, at the
same time, created mechanisms to sanction non-deliver of data from countries.
In 2008, the IMF Board (composed of finance ministers from around the world)
agreed to expand its access to data concerning the economies of its member
states. The decision and its amendments enumerate specific actions the IMF
Board is authorized to take if a "member has breached its obligation" to deliver
information to the IMF.90 The ultimate sanctions for a recalcitrant member state
are: Board censure, 91 prohibition from accessing IMF funding,92 suspension of
voting rights,93 and expulsion. 94 It seems only expulsion will generate a public
disclosure obligation. 9 Less draconian measures are contemplated for countries
that provide "inaccurate information" to the IMF.96
The data collection is undertaken so that the IMF can execute its
surveillance and enforcement duties with good information. The 2008 expansion
was undertaken in order to facilitate IMF oversight of the financial sector in
addition to the overall macro-economy. 9 A casual comparison on the data
points sought by the IMF indicates significant overlap with the data currently
collected by another international organization: the BIS. However, a key
difference between the two entities beyond their mandates is that one
organization has a pre-existing set of mechanisms to enforce its will upon
member states (the IMF) whereas the other (BIS) does not.
This IMF sanctioning mechanism provides a potentially powerful
enforcement tool for the IMF. Every time the scope of data delivery obligations
expands (as it did in 2008), the scope of the enforcement tool expands as well.
Most economists would likely view the 2008 expansions as minor changes
90 2009 IMF VIII expansion at 11 (cited in note 87) (direct quotation and paraphrasing).
91 Id (issue a declaration of censure against the member).
92 Id at 14 (declare the member ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund for its breach).
93 Id at 15 (recommend that the Fund suspend the member's voting and related rights).
94 2009 IMF VIII expansion at 16 (initiate proceedings for the compulsory withdrawal of the
member from the Fund).
95 Id.
96 See id at 18.
97 International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Reviews Progress in Members' Provision of Data to the
Fund for Surveillance Purposes, Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 08/60 (May 27, 2008) ("In view
of the increasing importance of data on intersectoral positions and exposures, Directors agreed
that high priority should be attached to increasing the number of countries that report monetary
and financial data ... expanding the coverage of financial institutions.., and introducing
additional information... for assessing financial sector stability."), online at www.imf.org (visited
Nov 21, 2009).
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designed to reflect shifting economic and financial realities so that the IMF can
fulfill its core mandate more effectively. From an economic perspective, this is
probably correct. The data collection mechanism itself is far from perfect. For
example, it fails to impose data collection requirements on sovereign wealth
funds even though such entities are part of the reporting entities and even
though their activities can have a material impact on the parent country's fiscal
and monetary policies.
It is not clear whether the enforcement mechanisms have been used. The
terms of the IMF's tool specifically contemplated public disclosure only in the
event that the last step (expulsion) has been reached. Given that the IMF's own
data posted on its website have gaps, it is easy to see that Member States have
failed to provide all requested data sets on a timely basis. Some commentators
estimate "that member countries holding almost 40% of reported total holdings
of foreign exchange reserves decline voluntarily to provide the IMF staff
information on the currency composition of their reserve holdings even when
the IMF staff has promised to control tightly access to such apparently sensitive
information and only report it on an aggregate basis.. . only 64 countries, about
a third of the total membership, subscribe to the IMF's Special Data
Dissemination Standards ... another 94 members subscribe to the less-exacting
General Data Dissemination Standard. Only 27 members do neither."98
Past failure to use all available authorities is not necessarily a guide to
future performance here. As noted, the G20 and the various entities that report
to it are increasing the scope and scale of their data requests. Access to high
quality data relevant to financial sector analyses will be key to the IMF's ability to
exercise its new "early warning system" responsibilities in a credible manner.
Moreover, the urgency of data collection could increase if economies either
continue to deteriorate or fail to deliver robust recoveries.
Therefore, this Article asserts that the IMF may have a strong incentive in
the near future to use the more formal sanctions for non-delivery of key data
sets. In addition to the institutional interests identified here, the IMF and the
Financial Stability Board are making quick strides in defining new data streams
that will be collected from sovereigns and market participants.99 The IMF's
ability to exercise its expanded "early warning" authorities allocated to it by the
G20 may well depend on its ability to receive and process these new data sets.
Under these circumstances, the formal procedures to compel data delivery may
98 Edwin M. Truman, The IMF and Regulatory Challenges (unpublished article) (on file with the
Peterson Institute for International Economics).
99 The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps, Financial Stability Board & IMF Report to the G20
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (October 29, 2009), online at www.g 2 0.org
(visited Nov 18, 2009).
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acquire new importance. Such engagement would represent a departure from the
informal political pressure through which the IMF Board can otherwise compel
data delivery. Under these circumstances, reliance by the IMF on the previously
approved sanctions should serve as a clear litmus test on the trajectory towards
customary state practice of permitting an international organization (IMF) to
penalize transparency-related transgressions on the part of member states.
Additional research would be needed to determine whether failure to
deliver information in the past could be used to establish exceptions based on a
"persistent objector" status. Additional research would also be needed to
determine whether more effective tools and informal practices exist within the
IMF structure or elsewhere to compel data delivery before the sanction
mechanisms are triggered. Any such alternative functional operating norms
would effectively also establish other customary state practice basis for
identifying an emerging international law. For example, since the BIS already
collects a good deal of relevant information, and since the BIS and the IMF are
now mandated by the G20 to share information in order to craft an early
warning mechanism, a potentially broad range of document production
responsibilities exist. It is unclear whether these additional data access points
would fall within the scope of the IMF Art VIII expansions discussed in this
section.
As the G20 and various components of its process establish priorities for
enhanced data collect, a close look at which entities are required to collect
and/or compel data using legally enforceable means represents a rich area for
potential future research as well as state practice. Reporting obligations have
been a traditional tool for financial regulators to exercise control over regulated
entities. Access to information also creates information asymmetries and
expectations by those excluded from the information stream that the recipients
of the information will be able to process the information well and use it
judiciously. The credibility of the G20 process in creating a more transparent
and resilient financial system may very well rest on the IMF's enforcement of its
data flow requirements.
B. Memoranda of Understanding
The IMF is experimenting with another novel tool that merits close
attention. Four Central European countries that are members of the EU
currently have in place programs in which the IMF and the EU provide them
with emergency financial support to help those countries address economic
weaknesses exacerbated by the financial crisis: Latvia, Hungary, Romania, and
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Poland.100 A fifth country (Iceland) is part of the European Community and is in
the process of joining the EU and adopting the euro. In one of these so-called
"program countries," Hungary, the IMF has obtained and made public a
"statement" by private sector banks with offices in Hungary that they will
support their operations in that country rather than create an additional fiscal
burden on the Host country.'' The various Home and Host state regulators
were also present at the meeting, but they did not release parallel press
documents.
The innovations here are significant. The meeting at which the banks made
these commitments and crafted the language of the public statement was jointly
chaired by the European Commission (which technically has no enforcement
authority over individual entities) and the IMF (which certainly has no authority
over private sector entities).0 2 Other entities participating in the meeting with no
formal authority over the affected banks included the World Bank, the
European Investment Bank and the European Central Bank."3 In addition, the
IMF is creating and making public documents that technically have no legal right
to be enforced (memoranda of understanding). Moreover, those documents are
executed by private sector entities, not by their governments, and they are made
10 As of August 27, 2009, the IMF had provided Stand-by Arrangements support to Latvia in the
amount of 1,522 million Special Drawing Rights ("SDRs'", of which only 535 million had been
used (422 percent of its quota). Support to Iceland amounted to 1,400 million SDRs, of which
560 million had been used (476 percent of its quota). Support to Hungary amounted to 10,538
million SDRs, of which 7,587 million had been used (731 percent of its quota). Support to
Romania amounted to 4,370 million SDR in the first tranche (424 percent of its quota). In
addition, Poland was granted a flexible line of credit (13,690 million SDRs).
101 See European Banking Group Coordination Meeting for Hungary, Concluding Statement by
Participating Parent Banks (May 20, 2009), online at
www.imf.org/extemal/np/cm/2009/052009.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009). The banks specifically
state that it is in their "collective interest and in the interest of Hungary for all of us to reconfirm,
in a coordinated way, our commitment to maintain our overall exposure to Hungary." Id at 5.
They also "acknowledge that our subsidiaries in Hungary have been and will continue to adjust to
the current challenging economic environment. A need for additional capital cannot be excluded,
and will be met as necessary." Id at T 6. They indicate a willingness to "discuss the results of stress
tests in a group, as well as bilaterally with Hungarian authorities, and to agree on any necessary
further steps based on these discussions." Id at 7. Finally, the private banks indicate they are
"prepared to confirm these commitments, within the framework of the international financial
support package, on a bilateral basis with the Hungary authorities, and under report to our home
country supervisory authorities, according to European and the respective national regulatory
frameworks." Id at 8.
102 See Joint IMF, EC Press Release on the European Banking Group Coordination Meeting for Hungary, IMF
Press Release No 09/180 (May 20, 2009), online at www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/
pr09180.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009).
103 The Maastricht Treaty contemplates that the ECB could one-day exercise supervisory authority
within the European area. However, for a range of political reasons, the ECB has chosen not to
exercise this authority.
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public by a treaty-based international organization in order to provide assurances
about the stability of the financial relationship between Home and Host states.104
A direct relationship has existed between the IMF and Home country
banks in the past, most notably in connection with restructuring of debt from
Latin America in the 1980s. But these were negotiations between holders of debt
and providers of additional liquidity, executed after problems had developed and
agreed to as a condition to finding resolution to a crisis.0' The agreement with
European banks that have operations in Hungary is entirely different. The
private sector participants are not negotiating the terms of a debt restructuring.
They are providing an open-ended guarantee of support for their legally separate
subsidiaries in a crisis country.
Nation-state members' use of the IMF Board to galvanize financial support
directly from the private market participants themselves (rather than from the
IMF itself) suggests an evolution and potential expansion of the IMF's authority
as it seeks to fulfill its mandate to promote financial system stability. It also
raises serious doubts about the ability of Home state governments either to
enforce their own laws or, in the case of separate subsidiaries where no legal
requirement to serve as a source of strength exists, their willingness to provide
taxpayer funds at Home in order to relieve financial stresses abroad.
If IMF Board members and private market participants treat these
agreements as having the force of law, this is another area where customary
practice may be generating new law before our eyes. We cannot know whether
in fact these memoranda of understanding will have the force of law unless and
until they are triggered.
This is not the first time that the IMF has experimented with memoranda
of understanding, creative mobilization of funding, and statements of support
for crisis countries. 106 For example, in the Korea case, the IMF describes its
engagement with the private sector as follows:
104 A separate question for another day is whether private individuals or corporations may have
standing to pursue enforcement of such memoranda of understanding in the event that they are
not honored during a crisis. To date, the operative legal standard continues to be that private
individuals do not have standing under public international law. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company Ltd (Second Phase) (Belgium v Spain), 1970 ICJ 3, 44. For a good, clear summary of the case
and a modern perspective on its implications, see Lawrence J. Lee, Barcelona Traction in the 21st
Century: Revisiting its Customary and Pofiy Underpinnings 35 Years Later, 42 Stan J Ind L 237 (2006)
(analyzing the Barcelona Traction case, which held that a corporation is a national of the state in
which it is incorporated for the purpose of diplomatic protection).
105 See Rieffel, Restructuring Sovereign Debt, 149-177 (cited in note 89) (discussing the Latin America
debt crisis of the 1980s and the Brady Plan solution).
106 Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser, Bailouts or Bail-INS: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging
Markets 109 (Peterson Institute for International Economics and the Council on Foreign
Relations 1994) (discussing partial bailouts and bail-ins of Mexico and Korea). See also,
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".. . with the evident failure of the earlier strategy, the authorities in the
IMF's major shareholder governments began to contact their banks and
urged them to announce jointly that they would maintain their credit lines to
Korea. It was hoped that a joint public announcement by the largest
international banks would stabilize markets by eliminating the fear that
Korea would soon run out of foreign exchange. Three initiatives-the
strengthened reform program, the accelerated disbursements, and the
coordinated private sector rollover of short-term debt-were announced on
December 24, 1997. The IMF played a useful role in the more concerted
approach to maintaining private sector exposure by setting up systems to
monitor daily exposure and facilitating information exchange among the
major governments."' 107
IMF engagement with the private sector in the context of sovereign work-out
situations is also well known.
The novelty in the Hungary case is the involvement of the EU. The need
to rely on the IMF as both a source of capital for the EU and as a convening
authority for the meeting suggests the growing importance of the IMF and the
relative weakness of the EU to resolve regulatory disputes. The 2009 MoU
creates broad statements of support for Hungarian subsidiaries that go much
further conceptually than merely keeping credit lines open to sovereigns in the
heat of a crisis. The MoU also goes much further than the traditional
understanding of the obligation between parent banks and their branches or
subsidiaries. It also requires Home state regulators to waive restrictions on
outflows of funds from the parent bank in the event that support for Host state
operations is required. These MoUs break new ground and potentially invert the
Home/Host relationship if they are triggered and enforced fully.
The engagement by the IMF in crafting the details of the regulatory
relationships captured in the Hungary MoU also sets up the potential for
different policy reactions under the G20 umbrella. The IMF has now established
a strong preference for two things. First, the IMF prefers arrangements that
clearly state parent banks' commitment to support claims from their foreign
offices. Second, the IMF prefers that Home and Host regulators ensure their
support flows downstream as needed to avoid intensification of a fiscal or
monetary crisis, due to bank failures in the Host country. Both preferences are
understandable, given the IMF's current mandate. They may also be
conceptually consistent with G20 efforts to create requirements that complex,
globally active firms craft winding-up or "de-risking" plans before trouble
occurs, if those agreements generate significant support commitments for Host
state activities. It is also possible that the "de-risking" agreements could generate
International Monetary Fund, Evaluation Report: the IMF and Recent Capital Account Crises ("IEO
Report") (2003).
107 IEO Report at 20 (cited in note 106).
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the opposite obligation: ring-fencing local assets for the use of Host states and
limited support arrangements between Home and Host operations.
Given the web of treaty and economic relationships among EU Member
States, eurozone members, and eurozone candidate states, and given the growing
international prominence and respect that Brussels has acquired following the
economic crisis, the need to involve the IMF to orchestrate a statement of
support among EU Member State regulators and banks suggests a deep political
weakness in Brussels. It suggests that Brussels alone could not have negotiated
the kind of support arrangement the IMF sought. The IMF has been quick to
capitalize on this weakness, noting, "When the crisis hit, there was no
institutional framework-even within the European Union-for coordinating a
response."' ' Some European leaders have also expressly recognized the
strength of the IMF relative to the EU: "The IMF has a unique governance
model. It is fair to conclude that the Fund's governance is relatively effective and
efficient, particularly in comparison with other international institutions."10 9
The evolution of the IMF's responsibilities is subtle, but clear. The
evolution also suggests that, as the IMF begins to more actively exercise its early
warning responsibilities, it could have clear views about what kinds of
statements of support and commitments it will require from financial
institutions in order to eliminate or forestall building financial vulnerabilities. But
whether the IMF is up to the challenge is another question. As leading
commentators have noted, the IMF's ability to exercise existing policing
authorities in areas where it has direct competence (for example, global
imbalances) failed spectacularly to contain the flow of funds into the US, which
helped fuel the disastrous boom in housing finance. 110 The IMF's failure here
was the lack of political will among Nation States to act upon the IMF's
warnings.
Only state action can provide the basis under which the G20 and the IMF
can fulfill the promises they are making to the international community. As the
earlier history of UNCLOS negotiations suggests, protracted treaty negotiations
are not likely to provide appropriate, timely, or effective means of addressing the
challenges that global financial markets present to policymakers when both
banks and regulators fail to contain risks. Moreover, attempting to codify
108 Agreement with Banks Limits Crisis in Emerging Europe, IMF Survey Magazine Interview, October 28,
2009, online at http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/INT102809A.htm (visited Nov
21, 2009).
19 Statement by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Ministere des Finances, Belgium,
Didier Reynders, at the Twentieth meeting of the International Monetary and Finance Committee
of the IMF (October 4, 2009) (on behalf of Austria, Belgium, Belarus, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Slovak Rep, Solvenia, Turkey).
110 The IME and Regulatory Challenges (cited in note 98).
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standards too quickly can backfire as states waste years arguing over new ideas in
treaty negotiations. Custom and state action provides more flexible and credible
ways to address quickly evolving risk scenarios.
Skeptics will argue that past custom and state action means the trajectory
will be retrograde. This Article makes the case, instead, that recent state action is
creating a foundation for the IMF to assume a larger and more effective global
role in policing global markets through data reporting requirements and
engagement in building agreements that structure banks' obligations to their
customers at Home and in Host states. The development of customary
international law is not linear; we cannot expect the evolution of the IMF's
authority in this area to be linear either.
VI. CONCLUSION
The challenges before the global financial system require real political
leadership and vision. G20 leaders are actively and consciously changing the
navigation system by which financial firms will be supervised globally going
forward. In addition to crafting political parameters for regulatory policies in a
broad range of areas (for example, capital adequacy, accounting, executive
compensation, and transparency), they are increasing the authority of
international organizations and informal global standard-setters to articulate
norms and act at the global stage when systemic risks arise. They are creating
customary international banking law before our eyes.
Paying attention to the alphabet soup of institutional bodies and their
international legal status will help market participants and policymakers alike
keep track of which areas are garnering global support and which areas would
merit attention from a "persistent objector." The evolution of the law of the sea
provides good guideposts for policymakers and international lawyers to
determine what mechanisms work best (and what pitfalls to avoid) when seeking
to articulate new international law norms in the financial context.
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